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This study examines the impacts of matching competitive envi-
ronment, business strategy, and corporate governance structure on
firm performance. We predict that in a dynamic environment, firms
pursuing a product differentiation strategy will perform better than
firms pursuing a strategy of cost leadership, but the performance
differential is affected by the level of board independence and
managerial share ownership. In a stable environment, we predict
that firms pursuing a strategy of cost leadership will perform better
than firms pursuing a product differentiation strategy, and the
performance differential is affected by the level of board indepen-
dence and managerial share ownership.
Overall, the results are consistent with the predictions of this
study. Board independence and managerial ownership affect the
performance differential between product differentiators and cost
leaders in a dynamic environment. In a stable environment, how-
ever, the results are not statistically significant.
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Introduction
The purpose of this study is to
investigate the performance implica-
tions of a misfit among competitive
environment, business strategy and
governance structure. We argue that in
a dynamic environment, firms that
pursue a product differentiation strat-
egy will perform better than those that
pursue a cost leadership strategy. This
is because by focusing on satisfying
customers’ needs in terms of innova-
tive products, quality, and special fea-
tures, product differentiators will re-
spond better to the dynamic environ-
ment characterized by rapid changes
in product designs, improved quality,
and product features. Moreover, we
predict that the performance advan-
tage of product differentiators over
cost leaders will be affected by the
levels of board independence and
managerial share ownership.
In contrast, by focusing on effi-
ciency, a cost leadership strategy is a
good fit with a stable environment.
Therefore, we predict that in a stable
environment characterized with stan-
dardized products and processes, cost
leaders will outperform product
differentiators. The performance ad-
vantage of cost leaders over product
differentiators will be affected by the
levels of board independence and
managerial share ownership.
In this study, we measure busi-
ness strategy based on cluster analyses
using R&D Intensity, Asset Utiliza-
tion Efficiency, and Premium Price
Capability. Board independence is
measured based on the ratio of outside
directors to total number of directors
on the board. Managerial ownership is
determined as the ratio of shares ben-
eficially owned by all directors and
executive officers of the firm to total
number of common shares outstand-
ing. We use return on investment (ROI)
to measure firm performance.
The remainder of the paper is or-
ganized as follows. Section two dis-
cusses previous related literature, hy-
potheses and the regression model used
to test the predictions. Section three
explains the research method and how
to measure the variables used in this
study. Section four presents the results
of the statistical analyses followed by
general discussion of the main results,
recommendations, and direction for
future research in this area.
Related Literature and
Hypotheses
Competitive Environment,
Strategic Orientation, Board
Independence and Firm
Performance
Researchers argue that board of
directors helps a firm to obtain advice
and access to information from direc-
tors with different backgrounds, skills,
and networks (Dallas 2001), to coordi-
nate with external environment (Pfefer
and Salancik 1978), to reduce transac-
tion costs associated with environmen-
tal interdependency (Williamson
1975), and to enhance monitoring of
the firm’s activities (Byrd and Hickman
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1992; Fama and Jensen 1983). Previ-
ous studies investigating the relation-
ship between degree of board indepen-
dence and firm performance have fo-
cused their investigation on the man-
agement-monitoring function of the
boards.
Dallas (2001) reports that board
of directors performs multiple roles.
Besides the manager-monitoring (su-
pervisory) role, board of directors also
performs relational and strategic man-
agement roles. Relational role refers
to the role of board of directors in
facilitating the sharing of information
among a firm’s various stakeholders,
such as shareholders, customers, and
the legal and financial community, and
to ensure that the firm continues to
support these stakeholders. Strategic
management role refers to the role of
board of directors to facilitate the de-
velopment and implementation of the
firm’s competitive strategy. The mul-
tiple roles of the board of directors
often come into conflict with each
other. Performing the relational and
strategic management roles by the
boards, for example, may be in con-
flict with manager-monitoring activi-
ties by the board.
Zahra (1996) argues that because
of the multiple roles performed by the
board, firms with different board char-
acteristics may pursue different strate-
gies that positively affect the firm
performance through management’s
choice of more or less risky strategies.
On one hand, firms that pursue a strat-
egy of differentiation, for example,
will benefit more from boards com-
posed predominantly of outside direc-
tors. This is because outside directors
with greater knowledge about and ex-
perience with external affairs seem to
be a viable way of co-opting with a
dynamic environment and reducing
environment uncertainty (Dallas 2001)
and to deal more effectively with un-
certainties of firms’ customers, com-
petitors, suppliers, technologies, and
economic circumstances (Zahra and
Pearce 1998). Furthermore, based on
the basic premise of Porter’s (1980)
framework of generic strategy, com-
petitive environment plays a crucial
role in firms’ strategic formulation.
Firms need to consider the nature of
their environment, and then choose
either to compete on the basis of low
cost and production efficiency or on
the basis of superior quality and spe-
cialized product design to be able to
compete effectively. Previous studies
examining the link between competi-
tive environment and strategy tend to
support the notion that under a dy-
namic competitive environment, firms
will compete more effectively by adopt-
ing product differentiation strategy.
Zahra (1996) and Jauch et al. (1980),
for example, report that environmen-
tal dynamism is positively associated
with product differentiation strategy
and negatively associated with cost
leadership strategy. Other studies (e.g.,
Gupta 1987; Govindarajan 1986; Dess
and Davis 1984; Miller and Friesen
1982) have also found similar pattern
of relationship between competitive
environment and strategy. In addition,
outside directors tend to rely on output
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due to their lack of firm specific knowl-
edge (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990).
Simons (2000) argues that by using
output control, managers are free to
create solutions and opportunities that
managers had not previously contem-
plate resulting in higher innovation.
 On the other hand, firms that pur-
sue a cost leadership strategy will com-
pete more effectively under a stable
competitive environment, and will
benefit more from a board composed
predominantly of inside directors. With
greater knowledge about company af-
fairs and internal operations, inside
directors can enhance operational effi-
ciencies and focus on internal busi-
nesses through a better control of work-
ing assets (Dallas 2001). In addition,
inside directors tend to employ behav-
ioral control by observing the actual
behavior of management (Dallas 2001).
When efficiency is critical to success,
firms should use behavioral control
through standard operating procedures,
detailed job descriptions, and manuals
specifying in great detail how a task
should be performed (Simons 2000).
Previous discussion indicates that
firms pursuing a product differentia-
tion strategy will benefit more from an
outsider-dominated board of directors,
and firms pursuing a strategy of cost
leadership will benefit more from an
insider-dominated board of directors.
Furthermore, the strategic management
literature has shown that a product
differentiation strategy is more appro-
priate for firms operating in dynamic
environments while a strategy of cost
leadership is more appropriate for firms
that operate in stable environments
(e.g., Jermias and Gani 2004; Robinson
and Mcdougall 2001; Simerly and Li
2000; Homburg et al.. 1999; Zahra
1996; Lynn 1994; Rolfe 1992;
Govindarajan 1986; Porter 1985;
Miller and Friesen 1982; Jauch et al..
1980; Miles and Snow 1978). We ex-
pect that performance advantage of
product differentiators on cost leaders
will be affected by the board indepen-
dence.
In a dynamic environment, out-
side directors will assist a firm in es-
tablishing linkage with its external
environment (Pfeffer 1981), manag-
ing its external dependency (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978), and reducing its
environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer
1981). Firms pursuing a product dif-
ferentiation strategy tend to face a
higher degree of uncertainty as com-
pared to firms pursuing a strategy of
cost leadership because innovative
firms obtain their competitive advan-
tage by trying to satisfy the changing
demand of their customers by produc-
ing new products or by entering new
markets (Porter 1985) while firms that
adopt a strategy of cost leadership tend
to focus on producing standardized
products and try to benefit from econo-
mies of scale. Therefore, we predict
that when competitive environment is
dynamic, firms pursuing a product dif-
ferentiation strategy will perform bet-
ter than firms pursuing a strategy of
cost leadership; and the performance
differential will increase as the level of
board independence rises. This is be-
cause product differentiators will ben-
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efit more from outside directors as
compared to firms pursuing a strategy
of cost leadership.
On the other hand, when competi-
tive environment is stable, firms pur-
suing a cost leadership strategy will do
better than those pursuing a product
differentiation strategy. The perfor-
mance differential will be affected by
the level of board independence. Given
that environment uncertainty is low,
the potential benefits of having out-
side directors will be lower as com-
pared to firms competing in a dynamic
environment, and firms pursuing a
product differentiation strategy will
benefit more from having outside di-
rectors as compared to firms that adopt
cost leadership strategy. Furthermore,
by having more outside directors, the
potential benefits of matching cost
leadership strategy with the stable en-
vironment will diminish because of
the lost of opportunity to take advan-
tage of firm specific knowledge pos-
sessed by inside directors. The follow-
ing hypotheses are tested:
H1: In a dynamic environment, firms
pursuing a product differentia-
tion strategy will perform better
than firms pursuing a strategy of
cost leadership, and the perfor-
mance differential will increase
as the degree of board indepen-
dence increases.
H2: In a stable environment, firms
pursuing a strategy of cost lead-
ership will perform better than
firms pursuing a product differ-
entiation strategy, but the per-
formance differential will de-
crease as the degree of board
independence increases.
Competitive Environment,
Strategic Orientation,
Managerial Share Ownership
and Firm Performance
Distribution of share ownership
can have a significant impact on how a
company will be managed. Sharehold-
ers may exercise their rights to influ-
ence important decisions made by the
manager of a company. Jensen (1993)
argues that managerial share owner-
ship helps align the interest of share-
holders and managers. Some studies,
however, find that the relationship
between managerial share ownership
and performance is not linear. Morck
et al. (1988), for example, report that
for managerial ownership level be-
tween 0-5 percent, the relationship
between managerial ownership and
performance is positive, but for own-
ership level between 5-25 percent, the
relationship is negative. McConnell
and Servaes, (1990) also report a non-
linear pattern of relationship between
managerial ownership and perfor-
mance similar to that of Morck et al.
(1988). They argue that while Jensen’s
(1993) convergence of interest hypoth-
esis holds over small percentage of
managerial ownership, the increasing
level of managerial ownership can
transfer additional risk to managers
beyond their non-diversifiable human
capital that might lead to risk avoid-
ance behavior on the part of manage-
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ment that is not in the best interest of
shareholders.
If substantial managerial share
ownership leads to undesirable risk
avoidance behavior, then for a firm
that pursues a product differentiation
strategy, increasing level of manage-
rial share ownership will have a nega-
tive impact on the firm performance.
This is because for an innovative firm,
creativity and innovativeness are cru-
cial to a firm’s long term success.
Unwillingness to engage in risky but
strategically important projects such
as investments in research and devel-
opment activities might jeopardize the
firm’s sustainable competitive advan-
tages. Therefore, we predict that the
negative effect of increased manage-
rial share ownership will be greater for
firms that pursue a strategy of product
differentiation as compared to those
pursuing a strategy of cost leadership.
For a firm that operates in a stable
environment, however, the risk avoid-
ance behavior of management might
cause managers to choose safety in-
vestments and run the firm more effi-
ciently. This argument leads to the
following hypotheses:
H3: In a dynamic environment, firms
pursuing a product differentia-
tion strategy will perform better
than firms pursuing a strategy of
cost leadership, but the perfor-
mance differential will decrease
as the level of managerial owner-
ship increases.
H4: In a stable environment, firms
pursuing a strategy of cost lead-
ership will perform better than
firms pursuing a product differ-
entiation strategy, and the per-
formance differential will in-
crease as the level of managerial
ownership increases.
Research Method
To test the hypotheses, the fol-
lowing regression model is used:
PERFORMi= γ0 + γ1STRATEGYi +
γ2INDi + γ3MOWN +
γ4STRATEGYi*INDi +
γ5STRATEGYi*MOWNi +
γ6ASSETi + γ7LEVi +
γ8BSIZEi + γ9OWN5%i +
εi.................................. (1)
where:
PERFORMi = performance of firm i
in terms of ROI
STRATEGYi = an indicator equal to 1
for firms pursuing a
product differentiation
strategy and equal to 0
for firms pursuing a
strategy of cost leader-
ship
INDi = the percentage of ex-
ternal members on the
board of directors of
firm i
MOWNi = the percentage of mana-
gerial share ownership
of firm i
ASSETi = log of total assets of
firm i
LEVi =debt to equity ratio of
firm i
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BSIZEi =number of members on
the board of directors
of firm i
OWN5%i = the percentage of stock
owned by 5 percent
shareholders of firm i
Equation (1) allows us to estimate
the effects of STRATEGY, IND,
MOWN, STRATEGY*IND, and
STRATEGY*MOWN on firm perfor-
mance. In a dynamic environment, we
predict positive coefficients on STRAT-
EGY and STRATEGY*IND but a nega-
tive coefficient on STRATEGY*
MOWN. In a stable environment, how-
ever, we predict a negative coefficient
on STRATEGY and STRATEGY*IND
but a positive coefficient on STRAT-
EGY* MOWN..
Sample Selection
The sample consists of firms listed
on the Compustat S&P 500 database
for five consecutive years starting from
1997. Information regarding the board
and ownership data is obtained from
proxy statements filed by the firms
found in the EDGAR database. The
U.S. Department of Commerce pro-
vides information on industry concen-
tration through its 1997 economic cen-
sus. The sample is restricted to firms
with complete data for assets, liabili-
ties, shareholders equity, net income,
cost of goods sold, research and devel-
opment expenses, number of outstand-
ing shares, number of directors in the
boards, number of outside directors in
the boards, number of shares owned by
executive directors, and number of
shares owned by other institutions. In
addition, industry concentration ratios
for the firm’s standard industry code
(SIC) must be available in the U.S.
1997 economic census. Our final
sample consists of 129 firms.
Variable Measurements
The following variables are con-
structed using the raw data from
Compustat S&P 500 and proxy state-
ments filed by the firms.
Strategic Orientation (STRATEGY).
A firm’s strategic orientation is deter-
mined based on cluster analyses on the
following variables: R&D Intensity
(ratio of research and development
expenses to total sales revenues), As-
set Utilization Efficiency (ratio of to-
tal sales revenues to total assets), and
Premium Price Capability (ratio of
gross margin to total sales revenues).
Two distinct clusters are extracted from
a hierarchical cluster analysis. Cluster
one consists of 58 firms and cluster
two consists of 71 firms. T-tests are
performed to compare between the
two clusters in terms of R&D Inten-
sity, Asset Utilization Efficiency and
Premium Price Capability. The results
of these tests indicate that cluster one
has significantly higher scores for R&D
Intensity and Premium Price Capabil-
ity but a significantly lower score for
Asset Utilization Efficiency as com-
pared to cluster two. Consequently,
we consider firms in cluster one as
those that pursue a product differentia-
tion strategy and firms in cluster two
as those that pursue a strategy of cost
leadership.
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Board Independence (IND). Board
independence is proxied by the ratio of
outside directors to total number of
directors in the board. Outside direc-
tors are those whose principal occupa-
tions are not with the company as
indicated in the proxy statements. Re-
tirees who are on the board of directors
are also considered outside directors.
Managerial Ownership (MOWN).
Managerial ownership is measured as
the ratio of shares beneficially owned
by all directors and executive officers
of the firm to total number of common
shares outstanding. This ratio excludes
unexercised option shares exercisable
in future periods.
Performance (PERFORM). Various
measures have been used in the litera-
ture to measure firm performance.
While market-based measures tend to
be more objective than accounting-
based measures, they are affected by
many uncontrollable factors.
Hutchinson and Gul (2003) argue that
accounting-based performance mea-
sures reflect the result of managers’
actions and therefore are preferable to
be used when investigating the rela-
tionship between corporate governance
variables and firm performance. In this
study, return on investment (ROI) is
used to measure firm performance.
Return on investment is measured as
income before extraordinary items di-
vided by total invested capital which is
the sum of total long-term debt, pre-
ferred shares, minority interest and
total common shares equity. Simons
(2000) argues that since investors in a
firm monitor their investment returns
carefully and hold top managers ac-
countable for these returns, it is not
surprising that the single most impor-
tant measure for investor is return on
investment.
Control Variables. We control for firm
size (ASSET), leverage (LEV), board
size (BSIZE), and large shareholders
(OWN 5%). Firm size has been exten-
sively used as a control variable in the
empirical analysis of firm performance.
A number of authors (e.g., Frank and
Goyal 2003; Ramaswamy 2001) have
suggested that firm size might influ-
ence firm performance. We use loga-
rithm of average total assets as the
indicator of size. Leverage influences
firm performance through monitoring
activities by debt holders. We measure
leverage as total liabilities divided by
total equity. The size of the board of
directors is expected to be associated
with firm performance through the rela-
tive influence of CEO on various board
sizes. Yermack (1996) argues that
larger boards are less effective and
more susceptible to the influence of
the CEOs. Total number of directors
on the board is used to measure board
size. Previous studies (e.g., Core et al..
1999; Cyert et al. 2002) indicate that
large shareholders also affect firm per-
formance by monitoring the CEOs to
mitigate agency problems and to in-
crease efficiency. We measure large
shareholders as the ratio of stock owned
by five percent or more shareholders
to total number of common shares
outstanding.
9Gani & Jermias—Performance Implications of Environment-Strategy-Governance Misfit
 Data Analysis and Result
Table 1 shows the Pearson’s cor-
relation for all variables used in this
study without partitioning by competi-
tive environment and strategic orien-
tation. Consistent with previous find-
ings (e.g., Young 2003; Singh and
Davidson III 2003; Hermalin and
Weisbach 1991), the direct effect of
board independence and managerial
share ownership are not statistically
significant. The relationship between
board independence and performance
is positive but not statistically signifi-
cant while the relationship between
managerial ownership and perfor-
mance is negative but not statistically
significant.
Table 2 presents descriptive sta-
tistics on the variables used in this
study for all sample and partitioned by
competitive environment and strate-
gic orientation. We use the Herfindahl
index that represents the degree of
industry concentration1 as a proxy for
competitive environment. Following
Cohen at al. (2003) suggestion, we use
units of standard deviation of the mean
to indicate the types of competitive
environment. We classify our sample
firms into dynamic, stable, and me-
dium competitive environment. A firm
is classified as operating in a dynamic
environment if the Herfindahl index of
the firm is one-half standard deviation
below the mean. If a firm’s Herfindahl
index is one-half standard deviation
above the mean, the firm is considered
to be operating in a stable environ-
ment. A firm is considered operating
in a medium competitive environment
if the Herfindahl index of the firm is
between the two extreme values.
Table 1. Pearson’s Correlations among Variables for Overall Sample
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ROI 1
IND 0.161 1
MOWN -0.078 -0.228 ** 1
ASSET 0.019 0.264 *** -0.234 *** 1
LEV 0.041 0.344 *** -0.098 0.342 *** 1
BSIZE -0.144 0.199 ** -0.303 *** 0.619 *** 0.345 *** 1
OWN5% -0.108 -0.047 0.102 -0.257 *** -0.098 -0.016 1
1 The industry concentration ratios are calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares
of all firms in an industry. The higher the ratios, the more concentrated the industry. Therefore,
higher ratios are associated with stable competitive environment and lower ratios are associated with
dynamic competitive environment.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
ROI IND MOWN ASSET LEV BSIZE OWN5%
Panel A: All Sample (n=129)
Mean 8.762 0.745 0.062 3.665 1.557 10.127 0.162
S.D. 16.027 0.111 0.089 0.519 1.308 2.652 0.132
Min -116.350 0.290 0.060 2.560 0.110 4.000 0.000
Max 40.150 0.950 0.400 5.100 7.640 17.000 0.791
Panel B: Partitioned by Competitive environment and Strategic Orientation
High Intensity (n=59)
a. Product differentiation strategy (n=25)
Mean 14.683 0.748 0.051  3.719  1.299  10.757 0.150
S.D. 9.606 0.094 0.090 0.500 0.813  2.106 0.120
Min 4.440 0.490 0.006  3.030 0.350  6.400 0.000
Max 40.150 0.860 0.328  4.550  3.340  14.400 0.480
b. Strategy of Cost leadership (n=34)
Mean 9.057 0.757 0.076  3.837  2.014  11.086 0.179
S.D. 6.606 0.116 0.105 0.536  1.397  2.775 0.139
Min -3.580 0.470 0.026  2.570 0.230  4.000 0.000
Max 27.830 0.930 0.051  5.100  7.640  17.000 0.578
t-test 2.761*** 0.298 0.946 0.860 2.289** 0.488 0.821
Medium Intensity (n=28)
a. Product differentiation strategy (n=9)
Mean  14.472 0.783 0.056 3.472 2.091 9.867 0.181
S.D.  9.127 0.076 0.049 0.513 2.232 2.435 0.156
Min 0.990 0.670 0.014 2.820 0.300 7.400 0.000
Max  27.530 0.890 0.123 4.330 7.500 13.800 0.512
b. Strategy of Cost leadership (n=19)
Mean  11.139 0.743 0.056  3.557  1.765  9.832 0.185
S.D.  11.261 0.098 0.097 0.433  1.377  2.256 0.185
Min  -3.410 0.580 0.003  2.830 0.370  6.800 0.000
Max  42.520 0.880 0.401  4.120  4.880  15.200 0.791
t-test 0.773  -1.084 -0016 0.457 0.477 -0037 0.061
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Continued from Table 2
ROI IND MOWN ASSET LEV BSIZE OWN5%
Low Intensity (n=42)
a. Product differentiation strategy (n=24)
Mean -0163 0.696 0.080  3.446 0.603  7.957 0.129
S.D.  30.155 0.133 0.101 0.547 0.467  2.621 0.101
Min -116.350 0.290 0.007  2.560 0.110  4.800 0.000
Max  24.200 0.950 0.369  4.590  1.840  14.800 0.355
b. Strategy of Cost leadership (n=18)
Mean  6.516 0.769 0.037  3.769  1.836  10.819 0.161
S.D.  11.689 0.111 0.033 0.467  1.191  2.262 0.094
Min  -35.570 0.540 0.003  3.000 0.120  5.600 0.000
Max  18.160 0.910 0.112  4.600  5.070  13.800 0.333
t-test -0889  1.893*  -1.727*  2.015* 4.631*** 3.682***  1.050***
***, **, and *, denote significance level at .01, .05, and .10 respectively.
Table 3.Regression of Return on Investment on Strategic Orientation, Board
Independence, Managerial Ownership, Total Assets, Board Size,
and Leverage Partitioned by Competitive environment
Results
Variable Prediction Coefficient β t-values p-valuesa
Panel A: Dynamic competitive environment (n=59)
Intercept  6.374 0.000 ***
STRATEGY + 0.672  1.880 0.033 **
IND + 0.199  1.665 0.050 **
MOWN - -0080 -0647 0.261
STRATEGY*IND + 0.479  3.973 0.000 ***
STRATEGY*MOWN - -0201  -1.661 0.052 *
ASSET + 0.233  1.977 0.027 **
LEV - 0.054 -0426 0.336
BSIZE ? 0.211  1.777 0.081 *
OWN5% - 0.284  -2.422 0.009 ***
R2 0.229
Adjusted R2 0.215
F 0.000 ***
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Continued from Table 3
Results
Variable Prediction Coefficient β t-values p-valuesa
Panel B: Medium Competitive environment (n=28)
Intercept  5.971 0.000 ***
STRATEGY 0.145 0.797 0.216
IND -0070 -0380 0.354
MOWN -0059 -0317 0.377
STRATEGY*IND 0.007 0.418 0.340
STRATEGY*MOWN 0.046 0.246 0.404
ASSET -0136 -0718 0.240
LEV -0079 -0420 0.339
BSIZE -0102 -0551 0.587
OWN5% -0384  -2.119 0.022 **
R2 0.147
Adjusted R2 0.114
F 0.440
Panel C: Stable competitive environment (n=42)
Intercept 0.657 0.516
STRATEGY - -0161 -0223 0.412
IND + 0.341 0.560 0.289
MOWN - -0180 -0209 0.418
STRATEGY*IND - -0144 -0268 0.395
STRATEGY*MOWN + 0.103 0.110 0.456
ASSET - -0279  -1.067 0.147
LEV + 0.098 0.405 0.344
BSIZE ? -0020 -0035 0.486
OWN5% + -0029 -0144 0.443
R2 0.083
Adjusted R2 0.076
F 0.310
a The p-values are based on two-tailed tests, except in cases of a directional
prediction, where we use a one-tailed test.
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As predicted, when the competi-
tive environment is dynamic, firms
pursuing a product differentiation strat-
egy perform better than those pursuing
a strategy of cost leadership (t=2.761,
p<0.01). However, the results indicate
that although cost leadership firms
perform better than product differen-
tiation firms in a stable environment
(as predicted), the performance differ-
ential is not statistically significant.
The performance differential of these
two groups of firms is also not statisti-
cally significant for firms operating in
a medium competitive environment.
Table 3 presents the results of the
regression analysis. In a dynamic com-
petitive environment (Panel A), the F-
statistics is highly significant (p<0.01;
Adjusted R2 = 0.215). Consistent with
the descriptive evidence, when the
competitive environment is dynamic,
ã1, the coefficient on STRATEGY, is
significantly positive (t = 1.880, p =
0.033), indicating that firms pursuing
a product differentiation strategy per-
form better than those pursuing a strat-
egy of cost leadership. The perfor-
mance advantage of firms pursuing a
product differentiation strategy over
firms pursuing a strategy of cost lead-
ership increases as the level of board
independence increases (i.e., the coef-
ficient on STRATEGY*IND is sig-
nificantly positive, t = 3.973, p<0.001).
These results support hypothesis H1.
Also as expected, managerial owner-
ship mitigates the performance advan-
tage of firms pursuing a product differ-
entiation strategy over firms pursuing
a strategy of cost leadership (i.e., the
coefficient on STRATEGY*MOWN
is marginally significantly negative, t
= -1.661, p = 0.052). The result is
consistent with hypothesis H3.
Figure 1. Interactive Effect of Board Independence and Managerial Owner-
ship on the Relationship between Strategic Orientation on Perfor-
mance when Competitive Environment is High
Panel A: Board Independencea
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In a stable competitive environ-
ment (Panel C), although cost leader-
ship firms perform better than product
differentiation firms (the coefficient
on STRATEGY is negative), the per-
formance differential is not statisti-
cally significant. Hypothesis H2 pre-
dicts that the performance advantage
of cost leadership firms over product
differentiation firms will decrease as
the level of board independence in-
creases. The result indicates that the
effect of board independence on the
performance differential is not statisti-
cally significant (t = -0.268; p = 0.395).
Hypothesis H4 predicts that the
performance advantage of cost leader-
ship firms over product differentiation
firms will increase as the level of mana-
gerial ownership increases. The result
reveals that the impact of managerial
ownership on the performance advan-
tage of cost leaders over product
differentiators is not statistically sig-
nificant (t = 0.110; p = 0.456).
Figure 1 illustrates the interactive
effects of board independence and
managerial ownership on the perfor-
mance differential of product differ-
entiation firms (cost leadership firms)
in dynamic (stable) environments.
Panel A of Figure 1 indicates that in a
dynamic competitive environment,
firms pursuing a product differentia-
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Panel B: Managerial Ownershipb
Continued from Figure 1
a The graph shows predicted values of ROI base on the regression estimates reported
on Table 3. The values of ROI for firms that pursue a product differentiation strategy are
the sum of the estimated coefficients for the intercept, STRATEGY, IND, and
STRATEGY*IND. The values of ROI for firms that pursue a strategy of cost leadership
are the sum of the estimated coefficients for the intercept and IND.
b The graph shows predicted values of ROI base on the regression estimates reported
on Table 3. The values of ROI for firms that pursue a product differentiation strategy are
the sum of the estimated coefficients for the intercept, STRATEGY, MOWN, and
STRATEGY*MOWN. The values of ROI for firms that pursue a strategy of cost
leadership are the sum of the estimated coefficients for the intercept and MOWN.
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tion strategy perform better than firms
pursuing a strategy of cost leadership,
and the performance advantage in-
creases as the level of board indepen-
dence rises. This result supports the
notion that in a dynamic competitive
environment, firms pursuing a product
differentiation strategy benefit more
from increased level of board indepen-
dence as compared to firms pursuing a
strategy of cost leadership.
Panel B of Figure 1 reveals that in
a dynamic competitive environment,
managerial ownership negatively af-
fects performance for firms pursuing a
product differentiation strategy and
firms pursuing a cost leadership strat-
egy. Panel B of Figure 1 also shows
that the performance differential of
product differentiators over cost lead-
ers decreases as the level of manage-
rial ownership increases.
Figure 2 illustrates the interactive
effects of strategic orientation and
managerial share ownership on firm
performance in a stable competitive
environment. Panel A of Figure 2 indi-
cates that in a stable competitive envi-
ronment, firms pursuing a cost leader-
ship strategy perform better than firms
pursuing a product differentiation strat-
egy and the performance advantage
increases as the level of board inde-
pendence rises. Panel B of Figure 2
reveals that in a stable competitive
environment managerial ownership
positively affects performance for both
cost leaders and product differentiators;
and the performance differential in-
creases as the level of managerial own-
ership increases.
c The graph shows predicted values of ROI base on the regression estimates reported on Table
3. The values of ROI for firms that pursue a product differentiation strategy are the sum of the
estimated coefficients for the intercept, STRATEGY, IND, and STRATEGY*IND. The values of
ROI for firms that pursue a strategy of cost leadership are the sum of the estimated coefficients for
the intercept and IND.
Figure 2. Interactive Effect of Board Independence and Managerial Owner-
ship on the Relationship between Strategic Orientation on Perfor-
mance when Competitive Environment is Low
Panel A: Board Independencec
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Discussion, Limitations, and
Implications for Future
Research
This paper investigates the im-
pacts of misfit competitive environ-
ment, business strategy and governance
structure on the performance of firms.
The results of this study indicate that
in the dynamic environment, firms
pursuing a product differentiation strat-
egy perform better than those pursuing
a strategy of cost leadership, and that
board independence has a positive
impact on the performance advantage
of product differentiators over cost
leaders. The results indicate that al-
though product differentiators and cost
leadership firms benefit from the in-
creased level of board independence,
firms pursuing a product differentia-
tion strategy benefit more from in-
creased level of board independence
as compared to firms pursuing a strat-
egy of cost leadership. This is because
outside directors are able to perform
relational and strategic management
roles better than can inside directors in
dealing with high environment uncer-
tainty faced by product differentiators.
This result supports previous studies
proposing that a product differentia-
tion strategy is a match with a dynamic
competitive environment, and boards
composed predominantly of outside
directors will help product
differentiators cope with uncertainty
better (Zahra 1996).
With regards to managerial share
ownership, the results show that as the
level of managerial ownership in-
creases, the performance advantage of
product differentiators over cost lead-
ers decreases. This result is consistent
with our prediction that substantial
managerial ownership leads to unde-
sirable risk avoidance behavior and
causes unwillingness to engage in risky
d The graph shows predicted values of ROI base on the regression estimates reported on Table
3. The values of ROI for firms that pursue a product differentiation strategy are the sum of the
estimated coefficients for the intercept, STRATEGY, MOWN, and STRATEGY*MOWN. The
values of ROI for firms that pursue a strategy of cost leadership are the sum of the estimated
coefficients for the intercept and MOWN.
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but strategically important projects
such as research and development in-
vestments. This behavior causes the
product differentiators’ performance
to decrease.
In the stable competitive environ-
ment, cost leadership firms perform
better than product differentiation
firms, and the performance differen-
tial is affected by board independence
and managerial share ownership. The
results show that the performance dif-
ferential between cost leaders and prod-
uct differentiators is not statistically
significant. These results do not sup-
port our view and prediction that risk
avoidance behavior of management
may cause managers to choose safety
investments, focus on the current op-
erations, and run the firm more effi-
ciently.
The results of this study may re-
mind practitioners that despite the com-
petitive environment and strategy cho-
sen by a firm, increasing dominance of
outside directors in the board will be
beneficial to the firm. Outside direc-
tors are able to deal more effectively
with uncertainties involving firms’
customers, suppliers, technologies, and
economic circumstances (Zahra and
Pearce 1998), and their knowledge and
experience of external affairs can more
viably reduce uncertainties surround-
ing the formulation and implementa-
tion of strategy (Dallas 2001). On the
other hand, practitioners have to con-
sider carefully the level of managerial
ownership in the product differentia-
tion firms operating in a dynamic com-
petitive environment since it decreases
firm performance due to excessive risk
carried by managers. But for cost lead-
ers in the stable environment, high
level of managerial ownership enables
the owner-manager to have plenty of
information to make decisions focus-
ing on efficiency.
The findings of this study suggest
that the misfit between environment,
strategy and governance has a nega-
tive consequence on performance.
These results are consistent with those
reported by Burton et al. (2002). Based
on a study of small- and medium-sized
production and service corporations in
Denmark, Burton et al. (2002) report
that situational and contingency mis-
fits negatively affect firm performance
in terms of return on assets.
The results of this study should be
interpreted in light of two limitations.
Firstly, this study determines competi-
tive environment based on the
Herfindahl index published every five
years, which represents the market
share of the firms. Further research
may consider other factors such as the
incremental number of new firms in
the industry and government regula-
tions to capture the intensity of compe-
tition. Secondly, the strategy of a firm
in this study is determined using R&D
Intensity, Asset Utilization Efficiency
and Premium Price Capability. These
proxies might not accommodate all
aspects of strategy formulation and
implementation in the firms. Further
study may consider using primary data
to measure the intended strategy that
managers choose to manage the com-
pany.
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